The European Union and the Paradox of Enlargement by Tatjana Sekulić

Author:Tatjana Sekulić
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9783030422950
Publisher: Springer International Publishing

The first part of the sentence uses the conditional in combination with the passive voice: “the negotiations should be opened”—as if it were something that could happen under certain conditions, the fulfilment of which depended entirely on the country in question. The EC thus reaffirmed itself here as a superior authority entitled to determine whether these conditions were fulfilled or not, without recommending any specific action besides the regular annual reporting of the progression. In this light, it might be considered as an act of de-responsibilization on the part of the EU in the frame of its commitment to the WB accession. The negotiations should open once the country has achieved what the European authority requests. The choice of the word once with its intrinsic indetermination seems to be in contradiction with the agenda conception of the accession process.

The case of North Macedonia and Albania may also be observed as significant at this point. The EC recommended in May 2019 Reports on both countries the opening of the accession talks. The recommendation was particularly serious with regard to the Macedonian case, as the country’s accession process had been in a stalemate for years essentially because of the ‘name issue’, which was finally overcome at the beginning of 2019.9 The EC initially proposed June 2019 as a possible date for opening the negotiations, but the European Council of 18 June 2019 postponed the decision on whether to open them (or not) later in 2019; the European Council summit in mid-October of the same year failed again to agree on the opening of talks.10 Besides, the EU Western Balkan Strategy of February 2018, recalling Juncker’s speech in September 2017, reaffirmed an “extremely ambitious” mid-term accession perspective only for Montenegro and Serbia as countries that “could potentially be ready for membership” by 2025. Such uncertain waiting times, during which the pro-European political and societal forces of these countries should keep in alert actors and agencies tasked to carry out the reforms, while also be ready to address potential social discontent, could have unintended consequences.

These examples shed light on the current condition of the European Union, beset by its internal multilevel conflicts and cleavages and buying time both for its internal reorganization in view of Brexit and for establishing a new political power balance after the 2019 elections. Serious and profound reflection is needed on how to the EU may rebuild its institutional framework and ensure its ability to cope with dramatic political and social transformations. As a supra- and transnational entity with a quite fluid identity, the EU has been faced with increasing Euroscepticism and the pressure of member states’ sovereigntist (nationalist!) claims, as well as by its internal democratic deficit, and a kind of confusion of its fundamental aims. The strong individual opposition of French President Emmanuel Macron to accepting any new member before the EU reforms itself, sustained in different formal occasions, as during his visit to Serbia in mid-July 2019, is a clear sign that both the integration and the enlargement projects are currently in crisis.

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